Oleg Solovyev
Communicative rationality in developing the concept of natural object in sciences about the Earth: History of dispute and methodological positions of supporters of natural installation and of model-target approach
Since 1970 up to the end of 1980th in former USSR the discussion connected with definition of the ontological status of research object was developed in sciences about the Earth. On the different parties there were representatives of a wide range of scientific schools and directions. Among them there were the researchers in the field of paleobotany (Mejen, 1984), lithology (Eganov, 1982), stratigraphy (Salin, 1979; Simakov, 1977), historical geology (Onoprienko, 1974), geophysics (Voronin, 1977), geotectonics (Solovev, 1986; Zabrodin, 1982; Kulyndyshev, 1979), methodology (Krut’, 1973; Usmanov, 1977), modeling of geological objects (Chetverikov, 1982; Sharapov, 1974). Dispute between the supporters of natural installation and the theorists of model-target approach had been based on anthropomorphic propensities of the supporters of the natural approach to announce ‘natural’ everything that is subjectively brightly discovered in our cognition (Eganov, 1971). Occurrence of these approaches had been caused by various results of reflective activity of the scientists directed on revealing and fixation of the objective party of scientific knowledge. This activity developed in two directions. The first direction was concerned with the discussion on the ideals, norms and efficiency of researches, and brought an attention to the questions connected with check of scientific hypotheses. The second one was represented by metatheory of science and as well by methodological researches which developed new principles of scientific activity. Discussion proceeded up to the beginning of 1990th when defenders of opposite views managed to find the joint decision, what content to ascribe to the term ‘natural object’, everywhere used in descriptive natural sciences.
Ontology sources come to light when the theory acquires quantifiable structure and explains truth-conditional dependences by means of systematical correlation of scientific concepts with the objects. In modern gnoseology and philosophy of a science the fact of asymmetry between the subject of proposition (what proposition states about; natural object) and its predicate (concept content; properties of natural object) doesn’t give rise to doubt. At complex quantifiable structure the scientific theory forms the objects corresponding to its propositions. Moreover if the used logic is the first-order logic, there is no necessity to form the objects corresponding to predicates. So if predicates implied ‘essential properties’, the supporters of the natural approach considered that ‘natural objects’ corresponded to them necessarily. Their opponents, on the contrary, believed that objects of research were formed artificially, expediently, and it was possible to set such properties for which forming research objects had been unessential and inexpedient (Eganov, 1990: 26–7).
The fact that the naturalness status was being confered on the objects historically is obvious to the philosopher of a science. Depending on, whether scientists of the consent have reached or not, the object can be included in scientific ontology and thereby will acquire the naturalness status or won’t be included and thereby will share a fate of pseudoscientific objects (Zabrodin, 1982). The natural sciences history is a history of studying numerous naturalistic objects, development and theoretical systemization of fundamental knowledge about them. After the considerable scientific successes connected with research of natural objects at a stage of disciplinary knowledge in the late XIX – early XX century, scientists had started to experience various difficulties at definition, classification and systemization of research objects. Whether the nature consists of natural objects? Whether objective language of a science is trustworthy? What bases can allow the scientists to correlate their empirical researches with external reality? Answers to these questions had led to opposition of naturalistic installation with arising methods of the model-target decision of research problem. In this manner E. Husserl’s works had begun with the critique of ‘natural’ positivism, and H. Poincare had offered philosophical conventionalism, according to which fundamental scientific principles were grounded on the conditional agreements, accepted in research community, rather than on external reality. At the same time non-classical ideals of scientific rationality had arisen in quantum mechanics.
After the Kant criticism the reference of any sense and meaning to corresponding cognitive function had become a condition and a premise of any methodological and scientific-theoretical work. Serious mistakes begin, when the scientist, dealing with the senses and the meanings, regards them as the concepts and objects. In order to avoid a rough determinism the knowledge sociology and gnoseology provide researchers of a science tools of a communication and reflection which allow us to apply reflective mechanisms of understanding scientific activity. Reflection tools are represented by the language means used in social practice at purposive effort of understanding. The elementary reflective mechanism works as a bunch of two knowledge planes – object knowledge and knowledge about object knowledge: ‘I know that I know…’. The reflective mechanism uses two groups of language means: the first one is for the representation of the object itself, another one is for representation of object knowledge. It considerably and essentially complicates cognitive procedures however without a meta language arising as the main product of reflective mechanisms of understanding, the researcher of a science wouldn’t have found a way out of deadlocks of disciplinary scientific language. The theoretical meta language allows us as well to standardize and to identify the rules of the reflection and the communication which are forming in research community.
In the theory of communicative action J. Habermas (1985) located rationality in the structures of interpersonal linguistic communication rather than in the structure of either the nature or the knowing subject. Really the scientist not always can exactly define a subject of the science. It is being proved by numerous disputes about the reference of knowledge to those or other ‘natural objects’. At the same time the scientist seldom makes the wrong choice of problems, means and research methods, being guided thus by interpersonal samples of cognitive activity. The science develops within the limits of many research programs, each of which contains the samples of achievement of significant results. In the sciences which are based on classical ideals of rationality the science borders were traditionally set by the referents namely by ‘the natural objects’. In the sciences which are based on non-classical ideals of rationality the scientific concepts can often be meaningful without having a concrete here-and-now referent, the objects become complex, and the knowledge – interdisciplinary.
In the geology the supporters of the natural approach were oriented on the cognition of spatial relations which were supposed to be objective unlike time relationship which was taking into consideration as subjective experience. Thus, according to S. V. Mejen, ‘for the geologist time is a space, and a relationship of various classes of times (physical, geological, biological) is a revealing of spatial relations between the traces that left corresponding classes of processes’ (Mejen, 1978: 80). The theorists of the natural approach believed in objectivity of the natural phenomena. By all scientific experience they defended classical ideals of naturalism. I. V. Krut’s monograph ‘Research of the bases of theoretical geology’ was vivid example of naturalistic installation in geology. I. V. Krut’ asserted that ‘the natural bodies’ existed objectively because the features, according to which they were being defined, had been most essential. This materiality of features, as well as the obviousness and the importance of their existence define a choice of the researcher in favour of ‘the natural bodies’. The author had divided the features and properties of ‘the natural bodies’ on essential and insignificant ones. Bodies had been divided on two groups of natural objects. The task of the naturalist was to choose from all variety of properties the properties which divide external reality into classes of the natural bodies. I. V. Krut’ considered these classes existing really, irrespective of our research. Moreover, from his point of view, the principles of their studying existed in the same way independently of the researcher. S. V. Mejen, describing a methodological basis of stratigraphy, – principles of Geksli, Stenon and chronological interchangeability of stratigraphic features, – as well searched for an ontological substantiation: ‘these principles can be compared with ontological equivalents, i.e. nature laws (sedimentation, statistical irreversibility of evolution, thermodynamics of ecosystems etc.) which do methodological principles by the effective tool of knowledge, give to them heuristics, justify their existence’ (Mejen, 1974: 18).
Long time the natural approach was completely dominant in sciences about the Earth and in descriptive natural sciences as a whole. Not at once, but gradually in consciousness of naturalists there were ideas about a possibility of plural pictures of the reality depending on the character, the purposes and means of research activity. So, already K. A. Timirjazev noticed that ‘the problem of physiology and methods of its permission are dual in relation to form-building process. First, physiology should aspire and is really (especially in phytophysiology) successful in experimental opening of the basic mechanism of this process, and secondly, accumulated action of the same factors ought to try to explain their own end result – creation of the form being considered as accomplishment of in advance marked purpose’ (Timirjazev, 1949: 408). It became obvious that the picture of the world in many respects depends on the chosen set of studied properties which are supposed to be the objective ones. Involving in this list of the features, which were not included earlier, opens new possibilities of the description and of the representation of this reality.
The non-classical type of rationality arose in connection with inclusion in a scientific picture of the world of a phenomenon of consciousness already at the beginning of the last century. It happened owing to historical development of scientific knowledge when former gnoseological assumptions and the world outlook bases of a classical science had ceased to satisfy some part of scientific community. In particular, the assumption that research object had been preset to us by the nature had ceased to arrange the scientists, and the belief in the unique, objective general meaning of scientific knowledge had lost its sense. In physics, and then in psychology, linguistics and a social science scientists realized that objects of research had not been preset by the nature. Objects are being set by scientists, which are pursuing empirical and theoretical purposes of cognition. It became obvious that objects, for example, the quantum mechanics objects were ‘not predetermined’, and their determination occurs in the course of research activity. Since then the knowledge about the phenomena and laws of the nature and as well about historical development was strictly to be being posed in dependence on results of researching a phenomenon of consciousness.
In sciences about the Earth the non-classical way of the description of ‘the natural bodies’ had been implemented in the model-target approach. Thus, using a colour as one of the bright properties at the description of geologic profile the scientists can delimit at once, for example, red-coloured, multi-coloured, grey-coloured layers. But it is possible that the borders of the objects, delimited according to the grains dimensionalities in these layers, won’t coincide with the borders, marked out according to the features of colour. If to take into consideration not less real feature – humidity of rocks, the scientist receives another partition, another arrangement of borders. At certain cases the borders of the objects being demarcated according to different properties, can coincide, but at any case it is possible to find the feature giving other borders (Eganov, 2008). It corroborated the representations about ‘nominal, artificial objects’, which depend on a choice of the researcher, and about ‘natural objects’, which are everywhere distinguished due to their bright or important feature, that invariably correlates with other properties of these objects. The island in the sea will be unanimously recognized as ‘the natural object’. And some, hardly appreciable rise of a sea-bed concordantly will be considered as ‘nominal, artificial object’, because appointment of a range of the depths is supposed to be a product of our mind that incomparably with that common consent with which the island was perceived. However, if with this area of hardly appreciable for us diminution of depths correlates any biocenose or, say, distribution of substance useful to us, for example, the concretions of some element, the ‘artificiality’ of such object (area) appreciably decreases, the object too becomes ‘natural’.
The pioneer of the model-target approach E. A. Eganov believed that the decision would come if during a research its purposes and practical relations are accurately formulated. The purposes help us to define criteria of check whether our choice of properties for distinguishing the objects was reasonable and correct. Only knowing, what in relations of things our actions should open, what we are going to study and what purpose of our actions, we can satisfactorily define essential properties of the objects and distinguish them from the others. Only at this case we can explain sense of our actions not only to other scientists, but also to ourselves. Expert’s work, which is ineradicable of research activity, should be elicited and be submitted to consideration of colleagues. It shouldn’t be included in process of delimiting research objects by uncontrollable mode. Otherwise the incompatible with each other concepts will face in the same terms.
‘The natural way’ of delimiting natural objects was considered by the supporters of the model-target approach as actually artificial, only inadequately realized. So, E. A. Eganov had established connection between the knowledge of ‘natural object’ and the character of means and of the operations of activity which were necessary for its distinguishing and studying. The scientist explicated these communications at methodological level, considering how the objects ‘not predetermined’ by the nature receive the determination in the course of research activity. It had allowed to a group of the Novosibirsk scientists who were engaged mathematization of geology (among them there were A. M. Borovikov, 1974; Ju. A. Voronin, 1977; E. A. Eganov, 1971; Ju. A. Kosygin, 1967; I. P. Sharapov, 1975; etc.) to draw a conclusion about avalanche increase in quantity of the problems caused by various aspects used in describing picture of the world, and also about expansion of the list of properties taken into consideration and to suggest to apply modeling methods in sciences about the Earth.
The modeling began to be regarded as a nature representation which not only creates the ‘portrait of nature’, but allows receiving new necessary information, which was not observed before. Really the production of new information defines an essence of modeling and gives us the right to name our knowledge a reality model. The combination of various parameters of the studying, the delimiting the objects with the necessary properties at specific goals were known decision of scientific problems. It had led to occurrence of the model-target approach and rational modeling in sciences about the Earth. Nowadays the researchers have an opportunity to assert that all objects demarcated in a reality according to various, but objective features, are existing in nature, though they can include each other or cross one another etc.
The model-target approach had been needed to formalize the natural object and the means of disciplinary scientific language used for its studying. ‘Formally the model can be considered as a scheme reflecting structure of the observable data and allowing to receive an answer to given question’, – American geologists believed (Krumbein, 1969: 8). Afterwards language of formalized research was surely to be a meta language describing empirical scientific research of ‘real’, individual natural objects. The supporters of mathematization of descriptive natural sciences, thus, were pioneers of non-classical type of scientific rationality in sciences about the Earth. It had caused objections of the defenders of classical scientific rationality both in geology and in geography. Discussion with the theorists of the natural approach represented the discursive rationality type, communicative rationality, by means of which ‘game rules’ were established and efforts of scientists describing and studying ‘natural object’ were coordinated. As a result of numerous disputes and discussions by scientists and philosophers the advantages and shortcomings of the traditional natural and the newest model-target approach had been discovered.
The philosopher studies a science as the special social programs of research activity which are directed on production and growth of knowledge. It is known that the system of natural sciences is reflective system, capable to assimilating the results of its investigation obtained by other reflective scientific traditions, first of all, by philosophy and methodology. In this fact that the research systems are capable to assimilating reflective results of their philosophical and methodological analysis, there were the opportunities of an exit from ‘naturalistic deadlock’ of classical type of scientific rationality. The shortcomings of the natural approach were marked in inadequate comprehension of the research activity by the very scientists who were sure that geological objects exist ‘themselves’ and are preset to us by the nature. Though actually ‘rather a wide choice of opportunities of delimiting material objects according to various features is represented to the researcher continuously. What opportunity the researcher will implement and what will become his considerations is a question’ (Eganov, 1971: 265). The scientists, followers of classical type of scientific rationality, reckoned that subjective ‘contribution’ of the researcher didn’t allow to coordinate the scientific terminology and precisely to establish borders of the natural objects. It became the cause of a refusal from the attempts to form united geological hierarchy of the natural bodies.
Despite the efforts of scientific community, such basic concepts of geology, as ‘rock’, ‘mineral’, ‘facies’, ‘formation’, hadn’t been correctly defined. In particular, the intensification of disputes about concept ‘formation’ was caused by mass attempts of formation analysis while the concept content ‘formation’ did not provide a coordination of actions. To achieve this coordination, it was necessary to carry out communicative actions, which were directed on understanding each other and defined by rationality of communicative experience. Such rationality was needed for geologists to establish procedural, logic, constitutive rules of the argumentation and joint actions. Meanwhile the scientists had formulated tens of definitions of such concepts as ‘rock’, ‘mineral’, ‘facies’, but any of them didn’t satisfy the strict logic rules and procedural conditions of handling these possible ‘natural’ objects.
The supporters of the model-target approach searched for the decision giving an accurate formulation of research objectives and its practical relations which should define the criteria of check of a rationality and correctness of the chosen properties at demarcating objects. Methodologically it meant the requirement to be in a reflective position when with comprehension of what can be opened by scientists, what they are going to study and what is a purpose of their actions, it became possible to define clearly the essential properties of research objects and to delimit the objects one from another. Moreover the scientists have realized that thanks to such effort of understanding they can explain sense of their actions not only to other people, but also to themselves.
At the same time the natural approach had not lost the right to existence. In 1979 the article of the theorists of sciences about the Earth V. Ju. Zabrodin, V. A. Kulyndyshev and V. A. Solovev ‘Natural bodies and an object problem in geology’ had been published in the collective monograph ‘Methodological and philosophical problems of geology’ issued in Novosibirsk by the Scientific council of philosophical (methodological) seminars of Siberian Branch of Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The theorists asserted: ‘At “the target approach” it is impossible to achieve the purpose of a science, the opening of fundamental laws of the nature’ (Kulyndyshev, 1979: 81). The following premise had played important role in this conclusion: according to ‘the target approach’, ‘there are no natural geological bodies in the nature. The bodies are being chosen by the researcher, and their volume and the content are being established only by the purposes and problems of the research. Their borders, determined by the coordinated list of properties, can be formally described. As concerned the borders of “natural” bodies this is impossible’ (Kulyndyshev, 1979: 80).
The authors believed that the existence negation of ‘the natural bodies’ was closely connected with the refusal from scientific cognition of fundamental laws. Along with it ‘in the course of formalization of geological concepts and adjustment of the terminology the researchers discovered that it is very difficult to formulate logically faultless and at the same time substantial enough concept of natural geological bodies mainly because different researchers understood differently both quantity of these bodies, and their hierarchy. Therefore in a counterbalance to such point of view, which was named “the natural approach”, “the target approach” has been put forward’ (Kulyndyshev, 1979: 80).
The authors recognized the scientific status of both approaches and had limited the approaches by various spheres of influence. They believed that ‘the target approach’ had been caused to life by features of structure of geology as a science: many of its disciplines had got purely the applied value and was necessary to serve the needs of practice (study of mineral deposits, engineering geology, etc.). Thus, from methodological point of view, ‘the target approach’ had been justified in those geological disciplines which were focused on practice. ‘The natural approach’, according to the authors, was directed on studying of natural bodies, i.e. the bodies whose borders were defined by the nature itself. It was connected with development of basic researches: ‘Both approaches are lawful within the limits of the spheres of their influence. Of course there is no necessity to deny “the natural approach”, as it sometimes happens, only because it was impossible to solve at once a problem of natural bodies and their hierarchy. All the more these difficulties shouldn’t allow to supporters of “the target approach” to assert that the geology not only has no accurately expressed (“natural”) object, but also essentially can’t have it, and the object is being created only with a view of concrete research’ (Kulyndyshev, 1979: 81).
At the same time the borders of ‘the target approach’ had been designated by its supporters, in particular, Ju. S. Salin, as follows: ‘If to speak not about principle applicability, but about practical applicability of target criterion, all happens to be much more complex. After all to establish, what concept will allow to solve a problem more successfully, it is necessary to solve it many times, using each time a new concept from among the concepts to be estimated. So as the number of all possible ways of concept definition infinitely, the task of a choice of an optimum version is impracticable even in principle. <…> Naturalness is constructive. <…> Naturalness is utmostly pragmatic: naturally is what allows to have reached many purposes at once’ (Salin, 1979: 54–6).
Thus, the new approach and new set of research programs coexisted with the traditional natural approach. Natural objects have remained in science ontology as the empirical objects preset by the nature. So the difficulties, caused by the natural approach and classical scientific rationality, hadn’t been overcome in many relations. The model approach, developed to the beginning of 1980th, had included into investigation as well the values and the purposes of scientific research. By then this approach already had been being known as a model-target approach. Its theorists defended the fact that there was not and there isn't ‘the natural way’ of objects delimiting (‘passive reflection of an objective reality’). Actually the researcher is constantly active, contemplates and pursues definite goals. Some scientists don’t notice this researcher activity, wrongly believing that the object is preset by the nature and the only researcher problem is to investigate it. From here are the different contents of the same terms and concepts, the inconsistent historical reconstructions, the incompatible descriptions of geological profiles, etc. The same is fair about field check of theoretical assumptions: ‘Field check of own theoretical structures, – marked V. Ju. Zabrodin, – as a rule, contains difficultly eliminable elements of subjectivity so as the aspiration to see what is assumed to exist is peculiar to the researcher. Clearly that it sharply reduces probative force of such check’ (Zabrodin, 1981: 6).
Along with these difficulties the geologists face inexplicit procedures of a logic conclusion and of concepts formation on a base of supervision and as a consequence with different understanding of ‘supervision’ procedure and all concepts inferred from supervision (Salin, 1979: 5). C. Dunbar and J. Rodgers warned that ‘stratigraphic distribution of fossils aren’t being known in advance, but can be established by only practical way. <…> Meanwhile the correctness of correlation should be checked in all accessible ways. Experience of field works will show that some forms retain rather steady stratigraphic position, and they can be used with the greatest success’ (Dunbar, 1962: 295). What means ‘practical way’, what separate steps make up this way, what will show ‘the experience of field works’, this is the question. Ju. S. Salin summarized: ‘Certainly every stratigrapher deduces the structures finally from the supervisions. But every of them overcomes the gap between the substructure and a superstructure in own way, and the main – isn’t known how. It is difficult to argue about the results whose procedure of obtainment is unknown’ (Salin, 1979: 6).
The theorists of the model-target approach have made the maximum efforts to get rid of illusions of classical scientific rationality. This rationality had laid claim to ensuring absolute scientific objectivity by means of exile of any subjectivity which is supposed to penetrate in researches of nature. Their opponents didn’t call in question the natural installation which implies the investigating the objective laws of the nature. In critical discussions both sides had taken into consideration the results of the researches, accumulated for decades of work on the bases of classical scientific rationality. The theorists of the natural approach investigated various ‘natural objects’ as the preset ones to a researcher, but in practice the naturalists distinguished them according to the traditions of research activity.
Communicative actions of the supporters of natural installation and the theorists of model-target approach weren’t limited to frameworks of a practical natural sciences discourse; they led out the researchers into reflective position of the philosophical and methodological analysis. Not at once but gradually the philosophers of a science had established the cardinal difference between the types of scientific rationality, being protected by the supporters of different approaches. Some time the philosophers identified the model-target approach with applied science, and natural one with fundamental. The charges of the supporters of new type of scientific rationality that they don’t cope with criticism of the naturalistic approach, because replace it with the modeling, were repeated constantly (Rozova, 2000: 88–89).
By the middle of 1980th the charges into the address of supporters of the natural approach in engineering by them of the artificial samples and in attributing to these artificial samples of the status of natural objects had been exhausted. ‘Material’ of research was suitably being estimated by scientists as natural, objectively existing. The subjective were the borders which geologists established in this ‘material’. E. A. Eganov noticed that all so-called natural objects are delimited on the basis of really objective properties, independent of our consciousness; they are accessible to reflection and are extracted from the nature, from a substance, as from an objective reality: ‘The necessary side of investigating the kinds and forms of matter (which for the inanimate nature are expressed by the term “substance”) is a posterization of the concrete reality, as well its division into separate “sections” and fastening of the information about these “sections”‘ (Eganov, 1971: 265). The borders of each of such ‘sections’ are defined by a feature set with help of which the scientist defines them. So the objects acquire the borders being marked out by the different sets of properties. As number of properties of material objects is unlimited, is obviously that the quantity of various borders in any material area too can’t be expressed by a certain number. It is possible to tell that their quantity is infinite. Geologists had concluded that their demarcations, being the subjective ones, nevertheless represent some real objects, which do exist in the environment and possess naturally objective properties. Up till now this conclusion serves as the base for obtaining many objective parameters of investigating the nature. Opposition of model-target approach with naturalistic installation had been overcome with the accepting the rule: naturalness is exceedingly pragmatic and constructive, naturally is what allows to have reached many purposes at once.
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